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Abstract
Voter Verified Paper Audit Trails (VVPAT) have been proposed as
a mechanism to try to make touch screen style voting devices more
trustworthy, e.g., [3]. We propose an analogous mechanism in cryp-
tographic schemes that use encrypted receipts and argue that such a
mechanism can yield considerable benefits, significantly greater in fact
than the benefits of VVPAT in conventional voting systems that use
plaintext ballots.
1 Introduction
With simple touch screen voting devices, the absence of any form of audit
trail to fall back on prompted many voting experts in the US to advocate
the use of a Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) mechanism, e.g., [3].
At the time of casting the vote, the voter gets to witness the generation of
a paper record of their vote. This record is carefully handled to minimise
threats of manipulation by either the voters or the officials. A well known
implementation of this concept is the “Mercuri method”, [3], in which the
voter sees a printout of their vote under glass. If they confirm that this is
correct, the vote is electronically recorded and the paper copy is conveyed
to an audit box.
It is not the purpose of this note to examine whether such mechanisms
really make touch screen voting significantly more trustworthy. Rather we
will describe how a similar mechanism can be used in conjunction with a
cryptographic voting system, such as Preˆt a` Voter, and argue that this
delivers clear and significant benefits. In fact, used in conjunction with
encrypted ballots, a paper audit trail mechanism works far more effectively
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than when plaintext ballots are used. We call this mechanism a “ Verified
Encrypted Paper Audit Trail”, VEPAT for short.
It should be noted that this idea has been mentioned, in passing, in pre-
vious publications, e.g., [4]. However, we feel that the notion is sufficiently
significant to warrant further elaboration in a small note.
2 Verified Encrypted Paper Audit Trail
For the purposes of this description we will use the Preˆt a` Voter scheme to
illustrate the concept, but in fact any scheme using encrypted ballots would
work. We refer the reader to [7], [1] for details of Preˆt a` Voter.
Recall the key steps of the vote casting process for Preˆt a` Voter: the
voter enters the polling station, chooses a ballot form at random, goes to
the booth and makes her selection. She emerges from the booth with her
encrypted receipt and approaches the vote casting desk. Here her identity
and legitimacy is checked by the polling officials. Assuming that this is okay,
a scan is made of the receipt and a digital copy is stored for eventual posting
to a secure web bulletin board once the election has closed.
To add a VEPAT mechanism to the above procedure we simply generate
an additional paper copy of the receipt at the same time as the digital copy.
The accuracy of this paper audit copy can be checked by the voter and
officials overseeing the vote casting and they can witness this copy being
deposited in a secure audit box. The lodging of the paper audit copy could
follow the Mercuri method for example, but this may not be necessary given
that the creation of the paper copy and depositing of it in the audit box can
be witnessed by the voter and officials.
So far this is very similar to the conventional VVPAT process. However
there are some crucial differences. As the receipts are encrypted at the point
of casting, the creation of the paper audit copy can be performed under the
supervision of polling officials rather than having to be done by the voter
in the isolation of the booth. The paper audit copy can thus be verified by
both the voter and officials. Furthermore, in the event of a problem, i.e.,
the paper copy not being an accurate copy of the receipt, remedial action
can be taken without jeopardizing the privacy of the vote.
The fact that the receipts are encrypted also means that there is no
problem keeping the audit trail in the form of a continuous, till receipt like,
roll. With conventional VVPAT, this is problematic given that the record
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of the votes are in the clear: anyone monitoring the order in which people
enter the booth and having access subsequently to the audit trail could
potentially correlate voters and votes. This usually means that VVPAT
must be implemented in such a way as to ensure that the records of each
individual vote is separated and shuffled, by for example cutting each ballot
copy from the roll. This leads to technological problems and malfunctioning
mechanisms etc. It also looses the major advantage of a till receipt: such an
audit trail is extremely difficult to manipulate.
3 Benefits
Such a paper audit trail using encrypted receipts, such as those used in Preˆt
a` Voter, provides a number of benefits.
A robust, manipulation-resistant physical audit trail to which one could
fall back in the event of the material on the WBB being called into question.
Whilst it is true that for voter-verified schemes, the voters collectively hold
a paper audit trail, it is clear that it would be difficult to invoke this as a
fall-back in the event of serious problems. Firstly, some voters might not
retain their receipts and, secondly, trying to gather together all voter held
receipts would be unwieldy and impractical.
An objection that is frequently raised against voter-verifiable schemes is
that it is likely that the majority of voters would not bother to check their
receipt on the WBB. Establishing likely levels of voter diligence is something
that will require investigation, but, in ny event, having a VEPAT in place
allows us to supplement voter checks by checks performed by independent
auditing authorities. Thus, organizations like the Electoral Reform Society
could routinely make checks of the correspondence between the audit trail
and the receipts posted to the WBB. This would also help counter vote
stuffing threats.
The above observation also helps counter such threats as discarded re-
ceipts and receipts buying, see [2], [6], [5]. The threat here is that an ad-
versary may be able to identify discarded receipts and so deduce that the
corresponding receipts on the WBB can be altered without fear of detection.
Alternatively, the adversary might be more pro-active and try to purchase
receipts, as suggested by Rivest, [5]. With a VEPAT in place, even if receipts
are discarded or purchased, there is still the possibility (or even certainty
depending on how the checks are implemented) that their presence on the
WBB will be checked by the organizations assigned to the task.
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It is worth considering whether the idea should be taken even further and
used to replace the voter retained receipts altogether. This would seem to
be in violation of the principle of enabling the voters themselves to verify the
inclusion of their vote in the tally. However, if a sufficient number of publicly
respected and trusted independent (mutually hostile?) organizations were
allowed access to the audits, this might provide a reasonable compromise.
It is sometimes argued that if voters lack confidence in the ability of the
encryption mechanism to protect the privacy of their vote they might be
discouraged from voting or open to coercion. Indeed, a possible attack is
exploit such concerns and claim (falsely) to be able to extract votes from
receipts and use this to coerce gullible voters. Doing away with the voter
retained receipts would avoid this objection. The opinion of the author is
that it is better to address the confidence issue, but the question deserves
to be raised and further discussed.
Another approach to addressing this concern is the idea of enabling or
enforcing ballot or receipt exchange, [5]. There do appear to be a number
of problems with the approach but discussion of this is beyond the scope of
this note.
4 Conclusions
We have proposed the idea of a Verified, Encrypted Paper Audit Trail
(VEPAT) analogous to the VVPAT mechanism previously proposed for
touch screen voting machines. We have argued that, when used in conjunc-
tion with schemes employing encrypted ballots, for example Preˆt a` Voter,
such a mechanism is in fact significantly more effective than as originally
conceived for use with plaintext ballots. This is due mainly to the fact that,
in contrast to the original VVPAT concept, a VEPAT can be implemented
using till-receipt style, continuous rolls, resulting in manipulation resistant
audit trails.
The possibility of replacing voter held receipts by a VEPAT mechanism
along with rigorous checking of the correspondence between the audit trail
and the WBB by publicly trusted organisations has been raised.
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